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Abstract: We expand upon the previous models of inequity aversion of Fehr and  
Schmidt [1], and Frohlich et al. [2], which assume that dictators get disutility if the final 
allocation of surplus deviates from the equal split (egalitarian principle) or from the 
subjects' production (libertarian principle). In our model, dictators may also account for the 
way in which the surplus was generated. More precisely, our model incorporates the idea of 
liberal egalitarian ethics into the analysis, making it possible for dictators to divide the 
surplus according to the accountability principle, which states that subjects should only be 
rewarded for factors under their control. This fairness ideal does not hold subjects 
responsible for factors beyond their control in the production of the surplus, an idea that is 
absent in the models of inequity aversion cited above (JEL Codes: D3, D6, D63).  
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The standard assumption that subjects only care about their own material payoff is frequently used 
to solve economic models. However, the overwhelming experimental evidence against this assumption 
(especially in the dictator experiment) indicates that subjects are willing to sacrifice their own material 
payoff so as to achieve fair allocations (see Camerer [3] and Engel [4]).  
In the field of experimental economics, the dictator game with production (e.g., Cappelen et al. [5], 
Cherry et al. [6] and Konow [7]) has recently emerged as a useful tool to investigate fairness attitudes 
towards redistribution. In this game, subjects contribute to the production of surplus before a randomly 
selected dictator chooses a division of this surplus.1 The findings of the literature highlight that 
dictators are willing to reward other subjects' efforts, even though this behavior contradicts the selfish 
hypothesis (Frohlich et al. [2], Oxoby and Spraggon [8], Ruffle [9]). It is also found that subjects 
exhibit heterogeneous preferences with regard to the distribution of the surplus (Cappelen et al. [5], 
Konow [7], Miller and Ubeda [10], Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido [11]), suggesting the 
existence of different fairness ideals.  
Although the importance of the production stage has been crucial to achieve these results, almost no 
studies of social preferences incorporate the source of the surplus into the theoretical analysis. The 
models of social preferences that have been put forward to explain dictators’ deviations from narrow 
self-interest usually focus on the way in which dictators divide the surplus, while leaving aside the way 
in which the surplus was generated (see Fehr and Schmidt [12] for an overview of the theoretical 
literature). One exception is Frohlich et al. [2] who generalize the model of inequality aversion of Fehr 
and Schmidt [1]. In their model, Frohlich et al. [2] consider that dictators' behavior depends on two 
different costs. On the one hand, dictators' utility decreases if subjects do not receive exactly the same 
monetary payoff, as in Fehr and Schmidt [1]. On the other hand, there exists a cost for dictators if the 
final allocation deviates from the subjects' production. By assessing both types of costs, the model of 
Frohlich et al. [2] allows dictators to choose the egalitarian allocation (which divides the surplus in 
two identical parts) and the libertarian allocation (which assumes that subjects ought to receive exactly 
the value of their production).2 Arguably, some factors that determine the subjects' production might 
be beyond their control, not withstanding that the libertarian allocation holds subjects responsible for 
all factors determining production.  
In this paper, we propose a simple extension of Fehr and Schmidt [1] and Frohlich et al. [2] so as to 
account for the possibility of dictators dividing the surplus according to the accountability principle. 
The accountability principle, as first proposed by Konow [13], combines both equity theory (which 
                                                
1 Hereafter we focus our exposition on the dictator game with production, which has been an important device 
for studying social preferences and distributional justice. We note that the existence of the production stage is 
important to disentangle the effect of fairness concerns and property rights in the final outcome. As noted by 
Cherry et al. [6], if there is not a production stage, then dictators might give money away, because they are  
fair-minded, or simply because the surplus to be divided is "manna from heaven", and dictators do not feel any 
right to keep the entire surplus for themselves. 
2 Frohlich et al. [2] use the concept of “just desert” to identify the division of the surplus that corresponds to the 
subjects’ production. We borrow the terminology in Cappelen et al. [5,14] and refer to this division as the 
libertarian allocation. Hereafter, we follow Cappelen et al. [5,14] in labeling the rest of the fairness ideals 
presented in the paper.  




makes the final allocation proportional to the agents’ inputs) and attribution theory (which considers 
responsibility or control over inputs). This fairness ideal is related to liberal egalitarian ethics (which 
assumes that subjects should only be rewarded for factors under their control). There exists 
overwhelming evidence showing that subjects employ to some extent the accountability principle (see 
Cappelen et al. [5,14,15], Konow [7], Konow [16], Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido [11]). We 
lack, however, theoretical models that predict this allocation. We posit a utility function in which 
dictators juggle the tradeoff between subjects' inputs and monetary contributions, so that dictators 
weigh three different fairness ideals: the egalitarian principle, the libertarian principle and the 
accountability principle. The latter fairness ideal is disregarded in Fehr and Schmidt [1] and Frohlich 
et al. [2], but it is relevant whenever subjects' inputs are differently rewarded to determine the size of 
the surplus, i.e., when there are factors outside the subjects' control (Cappelen et al. [5,14], Konow [7], 
Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido [11]). In this framework, it is plausible to assume that dictators 
do not only care about the final distribution of payoffs, but also about the way in which entitlements 
were generated. In particular, our model allows for dictators to evaluate the role of compensation and 
responsibility, two features that constitute the gist of fairness (see among others Cappelen et al. [17], 
Fleurbaey and Maniquet [18], Rawls [19] and Roemer [20]).  
To the best of our knowledge, there are only two theoretical models that consider the possibility of 
dictators choosing the accountability principle (Cappelen et al. [5] and Konow [7]). Despite some 
differences in their functional form, the models assume that dictators endorse a fairness ideal (e.g., the 
accountability principle) and suffer a cost if they deviate from it. Our approach does also account for 
this possibility, but generalizes the framework by allowing heterogeneity in fairness preferences to 
take place within subjects. In that vein, we do not need to consider that dictators are motivated by a 
single fairness ideal, with dictators being heterogeneous in what they consider as fair. It is also 
plausible to assume that fairness ideals are tradeoffs against each other, and heterogeneity lies inside 
each individual (i.e., our model could be used to investigate whether fairness principles are  
context-dependent, to study the consistency of fairness rules or to analyze the possibility of  
self-serving bias).3  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the models of Fehr and 
Schmidt [1] and Frohlich et al. [2] and then presents our theoretical model. In Section 3, we discuss 
our findings and use a couple of examples so as to clarify when our model does yield different 
predictions than previous models of inequity aversion in the literature. We conclude in Section 4. 
2. Results and Discussion 
Consider the dictator game in which subjects can be labeled i∈{d,r}, where d represents the dictator 
and r represents the recipient. The dictator has to divide a certain surplus 𝑦 ≥ 0 between herself and her 
                                                
3 The approach in Cappelen et al. [5,14] relies on the assumption of between-subject heterogeneity; i.e., subjects 
differ with respect to their consideration of fairness ideals (see also Engel [4] or Visser [21] for evidence of 
between-subject heterogeneity). However, there exists experimental evidence suggesting the existence of 
within-subject heterogeneity; i.e., the same subject might choose different allocations (or fairness ideals) 
depending on the context (see, among others, in Croson and Konow [22], Konow [16], Messick and Sentis [23], 
Miller and Ubeda [10], Ubeda [24] or Yaari [25]).  




counterpart. The size of this surplus depends on both the subjects' monetary contributions, which are 
denoted by yi ≥ 0 for i∈{d,r}, in particular, 
where qi ≥ 0 represents subject i’s performance in a (previous) production stage, and pi > 0 is the 
weight assigned to this input, for i ∈{d,r}. In what follows, we shall think that qi ≥ 0 is under the 
subject i's control (e.g., exerted effort, time of work, money to be invested in a project, etc.). The value 
of pi > 0 is assumed to be independent of qi ≥ 0 and determines the way in which agent i’s input is 
transformed into money. We shall think that pi > 0 is outside the subject i's control (e.g., reward level, 
rate of return, luck, etc.).4  
The dictator has to choose a division of the surplus x = (xd, xr) that satisfies xd + xr = 𝑦, where xi ≥ 0 
denotes the monetary payoff that subject i will receive, for i ∈{d,r}. The model of inequality aversion 
of Fehr and Schmidt [1] builds on the assumption that the dictator dislikes unequal outcomes (see 
Nielsen [26]). More specifically, the authors posit the following utility function for the dictator: 
This function accounts for social preferences because the dictator does not only care about her own 
monetary payoff. The dictator's utility also depends on the recipient’s payoffs and the relationship 
between both subjects’ payoffs. In particular, the model of Fehr and Schmidt [1] assumes that it would 
be costly for the dictator to take more than half of the surplus, but it would also be costly for her to 
take less. The magnitude of the costs is given by the values of 𝛼 and β, which are assumed to satisfy  𝛼 > β ≥ 0 and β ≤1. This implies that the dictator cares more for inequality when she has less than half 
of the surplus than the dictator does when she has more.  
 As xr = 𝑦 – xd , equation (2) can be rewritten as follows: 
and the value of β determines whether dictators divide the surplus in two identical parts (egalitarian 
allocation) or keep the entire surplus for herself (selfish allocation). It can be shown that the dictator 
who maximizes equation (3) chooses the egalitarian allocation 𝐱𝐞 = (𝑦 2 ,𝑦 2) if 𝛽 > 0.5. Otherwise, 
the dictator behaves selfishly, 𝐱𝐬 = (𝑦, 0).5  
                                                
4 We acknowledge that it might be hard to disentangle which variables are under the subjects’ control and which 
variables are outside their control in some situations. We find, however, that the classification of factors within 
and beyond individuals’ control is beyond the scope of this paper. For further discussion on this topic, the 
interested reader can see Fleurbaey and Maniquet [18]. Konow [27] is also an excellent overview of various 
theories of justice that deals with this feature. 
5 For the special case in which β = 0.5, the dictator is indifferent between any share xd ∈  [𝑦 2 , 𝑦]. As Fehr and 
Schmidt [1] argue, the nonlinear versions of their model lead also to predictions x= (xd, xr) that satisfy  
xd ∈[𝑦 2 , 𝑦] and xr = 𝑦 – xd ≥ 0. The models of Bolton and Ockenfelds [28] and Charness and Rabin [29] do 
 
                                             𝑦 = 𝑦!+ 𝑦! = 𝑝!𝑞! + 𝑝!𝑞! (1)  
              𝑢(𝑥!) = 𝑥! − 𝛼  max  {𝑥! − 𝑥! , 0}− β  max  {𝑥! − 𝑥! , 0} (2)  
            𝑢(𝑥!) = 𝑥! − 2𝛼  max  {  𝑦2 − 𝑥! , 0}− 2β  max  {𝑥! −   𝑦2 , 0} (3)  




The prediction of Fehr and Schmidt [1] goes in line with the observed behavior in many laboratory 
experiments, where the equal split is a modal outcome (see Camerer [3] and Engel [4] for a review). 
The model is especially well-suited when the surplus to be divided as "manna from heaven", because it 
predicts an allocation that ignores the source of the surplus or its size. However, the underlying idea of 
Fehr and Schmidt [1] contrasts with fairness ideals that plead for a solution in which entitlements to 
the available surplus are directly determined by subjects' contributions, an idea that goes back to  
Selten [30] and it presented in Cherry et al. [6], Oxoby and Spraggon [8] or Ruffle [9], among others. 
The libertarian ethics indeed pursue the idea that subjects ought to receive exactly what they have 
contributed to surplus (Nozick [31]). The model of Frohlich et al. [2] incorporates this idea by adding 
two terms to the dictator's utility function:  
The utility function (4) expands upon the previous one so as to include what the authors call “just 
deserts”. Frohlich et al. [2] consider that the dictator suffers a cost 𝛾  max 𝑦! − 𝑥! , 0  if she does not 
take her own production, whereas 𝜓  max  {𝑥! − 𝑦! , 0} represents the cost of taking more than what she 
produces.6 The new parameters are assumed to satisfy γ ≥  𝜓 >0. The authors note that if 𝛼 and β are 
both zero, then just deserts affect the dictator's choice when γ >1 or ψ>1. If  𝛼 $ and β are not zero, two 
different contexts are at stake: when the dictator accumulates less money than the recipient (𝑦! < 𝑦!), 
and when the dictator accumulates more (𝑦! > 𝑦!). In either case, when 2β + ψ <1, the dictator 
behaves selfishly and keeps the entire surplus, 𝐱𝐬 = (𝑦, 0). If the dictator accumulates less money than 
the recipient and 2β + ψ > 1, the model predicts that the dictator will either keep half of the surplus or 
her own production, depending on whether ψ – 1 > 2𝛼 or ψ – 1 < 2𝛼. Both the egalitarian allocation, 𝐱𝐞 = (𝑦 2 ,𝑦 2) and the libertarian allocation 𝐱𝒍 = 𝑦! ,𝑦!   can also be predicted if the dictator 
accumulates more money than the recipient.  
The model of Frohlich et al. [2] generalizes the model of Fehr and Schmidt [1] and predicts that 
recipients might receive any payoff xr   ≤ max{𝑦/2,𝑦!}. Arguably, the prediction of this model 
contrasts with liberal egalitarian ethics, which states that subjects should only be rewarded for factors 
under their control. In that vein, the accountability principle as first proposed by Konow [13] states 
that the dictator will choose a division that gives to each subject the amount of money that is generated 
by her input. We denote this amount predicted by the accountability principle as 𝑎! = ( !!!!!!!)  𝑦 for i∈{d,r}, so that if the dictator ignores those factors beyond the subjects’ control, 
she will choose the allocation 𝐱𝒂 = (𝑎! ,𝑎!).We propose to model the dictator's utility function  
as follows:  
                                                                                                                                                                
also integrate equality as an argument. In particular, Bolton and Ockenfelds [28] show that the results of Fehr 
and Schmidt [1] are robust to non-linearity as well as incomplete information.  
6 We note that we have rewritten the original equation in Frohlich et al. [2] so as to follow our reasoning in 
equation (3). In particular, because yd + yr = xd + xr, the latter term in equation (4) can also be thought of as the 
cost of not giving to the recipient her production. 
𝑢(𝑥!) = 𝑥! − 2𝛼  max  {  𝑦2 − 𝑥! , 0}− 2β  max  {𝑥! −   𝑦2 , 0} − 𝛾  max 𝑦! − 𝑥! , 0   − 𝜓  max  {𝑥! − 𝑦! , 0} (4)  




Our specification assumes that the dictator cares about her own monetary payoff, but juggles the 
tradeoff between subjects’ inputs and monetary contributions. This implies that the dictator suffers a 
cost 𝜌  max 𝑎! − 𝑥! , 0  if she free-rides on the recipient's effort, but she also suffers a cost 𝜔  max 𝑥! − 𝑎! , 0  if she takes less money than what corresponds to her input, where ρ ≥ 𝜔 > 0 is 
assumed to be satisfied (i.e., the dictator cares less about the recipient’s disadvantage than about  
her own).  
The utility function (5) allows dictators to take into account the way in which inputs are 
transformed into money so as to "compensate" for those factors outside the subjects’ control. Our 
prediction is that dictators might (i) behave selfishly 𝐱𝐬 = (𝑦, 0) (ii) choose the egalitarian allocation 
and divide the surplus in two identical parts 𝐱𝐞 = (𝑦 2 ,𝑦 2), (iii) choose the libertarian allocation 
that is based on subjects' production 𝐱𝒍 = (𝑦! ,𝑦!) or (iv) behave according to the accountability 
principle that is based solely on factors under the subjects’ control 𝐱𝒂 = (𝑎! ,𝑎!).7 We summarize our 
results in Table 1. As we argue, the dictator's choice depends on the relationship between factors 
within and beyond the subjects’ control, which determines the relationship between 𝑦 2, 𝑦! and 𝑎!, as 
well as the values of the parameters.  
We derive these results in the supplementary material. Our model predicts that the dictator will 
behave selfishly, if 2β + ψ + ω < 1. If it is not the case, the dictator's decision depends on the subjects’ 
inputs (qi ≥ 0) as well as on the weight that is assigned to these inputs (pi > 0). Consider that the 
dictator is at a relative advantage with regard to the accumulation of money (𝑝! > 𝑝!) so that the 
dictator's production in terms of money 𝑦! would be greater than her production in terms of inputs 𝑎! . 
The values of qi ≥ 0 and pi > 0 determine in this framework whether these contributions (𝑦! and 𝑎!) 
are above half of the surplus (𝑦/2) or not. Assume that 𝑎! < 𝑦! < 𝑦/2 is satisfied. It is clear that the 
dictator gets the highest monetary payoff by choosing the egalitarian allocation 𝐱𝐞 = 𝑦 2 ,𝑦 2 . The 
dictator will choose this division of the surplus as long as the cost of deviating from the accountability 
principle (that yields the smallest payoff) is small enough. More precisely, 𝐱𝐞 = 𝑦 2 ,𝑦 2  will be 
chosen if ω < 1 + 2  𝛼 – ψ. If the cost is very high and the condition ω > 1 + 2𝛼 + γ holds, the dictator 
will choose to divide the surplus according to the accountability principle 𝐱𝒂 = (𝑎! ,𝑎!) that yields the 
dictator the smallest monetary payoff. If 𝜔 ∈ (1+ 2𝛼 − 𝜓, 1+ 2𝛼 + 𝛾) , then the libertarian 
allocation will be chosen because it would be very costly to divide the surplus according to the 
egalitarian allocation, but the cost is not sufficiently high to enforce the use of the accountability 
principle. We can follow this reasoning so as to explain the prediction of our model in Table 1. We 
                                                
7 Nonlinear versions of our model would predict interior results that lead to compromises between these fairness 
ideals. The interested reader can find a brief discussion about the linearity assumption in the supplementary 
material. We note that Bolton and Ockenfelds [28] is an extension of Fehr and Schmidt [1] to the  
non-linear case. The model of Bolton et al. [32] incorporates an idea that is related to the accountability 
principle in the context of procedural fairness; i.e., the authors use different games and investigate the extent to 
which subjects care about fair procedures.  
𝑢(𝑥!) = 𝑥! − 2𝛼  max  {  𝑦2 − 𝑥! , 0}− 2β  max  {𝑥! −   𝑦2 , 0} − 𝛾  max 𝑦! − 𝑥! , 0   − 𝜓  max 𝑥! − 𝑦! , 0 }   − 𝜌  max 𝑎! − 𝑥! , 0 − 𝜔  max 𝑥! − 𝑎! , 0  (5)  




observe that there always exists a tradeoff between a higher monetary payoff and the cost of deviating 
from the fairness ideal that yields the smallest payoff.  
Table 1. Predictions of our model. 
  Dictators’ Allocation Choice 
  𝐱𝐞 = (𝑦 2 , 𝑦 2) 𝐱𝒍 = (𝑦! , 𝑦!) 𝐱𝒂 = (𝑎! , 𝑎!) 
𝑝 !>𝑝
! 𝑎! < 𝑦! < 𝑦/2 𝜔 < 1 + 2𝛼 − 𝜓 𝜔 ∈ (1 + 2𝛼 − 𝜓, 1 + 2𝛼 + 𝛾) 𝜔 > 1 + 2𝛼 + 𝛾 𝑎! < 𝑦/2 < 𝑦! 𝜔 ∈    (1 − 2𝛽 + 𝛾, 1 + 2𝛼 + 𝛾) 𝜔 < 1 − 2𝛽 + 𝛾 𝜔 > 1 + 2𝛼 + 𝛾 𝑦/2 < 𝑎! < 𝑦! 2𝛽 > 1 + 𝛾 + 𝜌 2𝛽 < 1 + 𝛾 −   𝜔 2𝛽 ∈ (1 + 𝛾 −   𝜔, 1 + 𝛾 + 𝜌) 
𝑝 !<𝑝
! 𝑦/2 < 𝑦! < 𝑎! 2𝛽 > 1 + 𝛾 + 𝜌 2𝛽 ∈ (1 − 𝜓 + 𝜌, 1 + 𝛾 + 𝜌) 2𝛽 < 1 − 𝜓 + 𝜌 𝑦! < 𝑎! < 𝑦/2 𝜓 < 1 + 2𝛼 − 𝜔 𝜓 > 1 + 2𝛼 + 𝜌 𝜓   ∈ (1 + 2𝛼 − 𝜔, 1 + 2𝛼 + 𝜌) 𝑦! < 𝑦/2 < 𝑎! 𝜓   ∈ (1 − 2𝛽 + 𝜌, 1 + 2𝛼 + 𝜌) 𝜓 > 1 + 2𝛼 + 𝜌 𝜓 < 1 − 2𝛽 + 𝜌 
Note. In all the cases above, it is assumed that 2𝛽 + 𝜓 + 𝜔 > 1. Otherwise, the dictator behaves selfish, 𝐱𝐬 = (𝑦, 0). We do not consider the 
possibility of 𝑝! = 𝑝!, because (by definition) 𝑎! = 𝑦! in that case our predictions would be identical to the ones in Frohlich et al. (2004). 
3. Applications of our model  
 Overall, our model in Section 2 relies on liberal egalitarian ethics, which states that subjects should 
be only rewarded for factors under their control. The model is especially useful for those cases in 
which the dictator is at a relative advantage with regard to the accumulation of money (pd > pr), 
because in this case our model predicts a larger set of transfers from the part of the dictator than 
previous models of inequity aversion. In this section, we present a couple of examples so as to 
illustrate this feature. We also mention at the end of this section some experimental papers that 
produce behavior that is consistent with our model, and then discuss the relevance of our approach.  
To start with, let us consider a numerical example. Imagine that subjects solve a questionnaire 
during the production stage. In particular, assume that qd = 10 and qr = 15 are the number of correct 
answers, which are assumed to be controlled by the subjects (i.e., the number of correct answers 
depends on the exerted effort in the questionnaire). Consider that these questions are rewarded at  
pd = 1.5 and pr = 1, respectively, where the reward level is exogenously determined and is independent 
of performance.8 In that case, the surplus to be distributed is 𝑦 = 30 and the subjects’ contributions to 
the surplus is given by yd = yr =15. Since both subjects contribute the same (i.e., yd = yr = 𝑦/2), the 
models of Fehr and Schmidt [1] and Frohlich et al. [2] predict that the recipient will receive at most 
half of the surplus. It is worth noting, however, that the dictator might consider this allocation as unfair 
because the recipient has more questions correct at a lower reward level. Liberal egalitarian ethics 
states that the recipient ought to receive the part of the surplus that is due to her performance, which 
would compensate recipients for the lower reward. In our example, 𝑎! = !!!!!!! 𝑦 =18. This amount 
represents 60-percent of the surplus. Importantly, our model is able to predict this allocation, although 
this behavior cannot be predicted by equations (3) or (4). In fact, the nonlinear versions of our model 
                                                
8 The experimental design in Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido [11] relies on this production stage. In 
Konow [7], subjects are differently rewarded for a real-effort task that involves stuffing letters into envelops. In 
Ubeda [24], the task consists of solving puzzles, whereas in Cappelen et al. [5], subjects have to choose how 
much money to invest in an investment game in which the rate of return is exogenously determined. 




in the supplementary material can predict any dictator's giving xr in the interval [15,18], which are 
above the equal split allocation.  
To further illustrate that our model extends upon the previous ones, we consider Figure 1. Along the 
horizontal axis, we plot the proportion of the surplus that is due to the recipient’s production (yr/𝑦). 
We use the vertical axis to represent the proportion of the surplus that the dictator gives away to the 
recipient (xr/𝑦). As a consequence, the 45-degree line represents the appropriate theoretical prediction 
in Frohlich et al. [2], because observations on this line indicate that recipients are being transferred 
exactly the proportion of the surplus that they have contributed, i.e., the 45-degree line represents the 
libertarian allocation xr = yr. In Figure 1, we also plot the horizontal line (xr/𝑦 = 0.5), which represents 
the egalitarian allocation xr =  𝑦/2 (Fehr and Schmid [1]). The dotted curve depicts the accountability 
principle xr=ar. Therefore, allocations on this curve indicate that recipients are being transferred 
exactly the proportion of the surplus that is due to their effort.9 The difference between pd and pr 
establishes the concavity of the dotted curve xr = ar and determines those allocations that cannot be 
predicted by Fehr and Schmidt [1] or Frohlich et al. [2]. In particular, the nonlinear version of these 
models predicts no allocations above both “just dessert” and the horizontal line xr = 𝑦/2. Graphically, 
this implies that the models predict any giving in the shadowed area, except the striped area (i.e., the 
models predict xr ≤ max{𝑦/2,yr}). However, our model takes into account the accountability principle 
so that our prediction includes the striped area (i.e., our model predict xr ≤ max{𝑦/2,yr,ar}).  
Figure 1. Graphical representation of our predictions if pd > pr. 
 
                                                
9 Recall that we focus on the case in which the dictator is rewarded at a higher rate; therefore the recipient's 
monetary contribution to the surplus will be below her contribution in terms of inputs (ar > yr). Graphically, this 
implies that the dotted curve (the accountability principle) is above the 45-degree line (the libertarian principle). 
Both principles coincide when (yr / 𝑦) = 0 and (yr / 𝑦) = 1. In the first case, all the available surplus is due to the 
dictators' inputs (qr = 0). The contrary is true if (yr / 𝑦) = 1.We also note that we represent (yr / 𝑦) on the 
horizontal line and assume that pd = 1.5 and pr = 1. Thus, the egalitarian principle and the libertarian one 
coincide when (yr / 𝑦) = 0.5 (i.e., when yr = 𝑦  /  2), whereas the egalitarian principle and the accountability one 
coincide if ar / 𝑦 = 0.5 (i.e., when ar = 𝑦  /  2). In order to satisfy this latter condition, both subjects should have 
exactly the same number of correct answers (qd = qr), which implies that yr / 𝑦  = 0.4. 




All the allocations on the striped area give some weight to the accountability principle, such that 
these allocations cannot be explained with the models of inequity aversion of Fehr and Schmidt [1] 
and Frohlich et al. [2], in which the idea of liberal egalitarian ethics is disregarded (i.e., 𝜌 = 𝜔 = 0  
is assumed).  
 We find that our model generalizes the previous ones and can be used to explain dictators’ 
behavior, especially when the production stage involves factors within and beyond the subject's 
control. In that context, the accountability principle is likely to lead dictators' behavior, especially 
when dictators act as a third party in the distributional problem (e.g., Cappelen et al. [17] and  
Konow [7]). The results in Cappelen et al. [5], Konow [16] and Rodriguez-Lara and  
Moreno-Garrido [11] do also produce behavior that is also consistent with the idea of subjects who 
endorse the accountability principle. In particular, Cappelen et al. [5] consider a dictator game with 
production and estimate that 38 percent of dictators are closest to satisfying the accountability 
principle, 43 percent to being egalitarians and 18 percent to being libertarians when dividing the 
surplus. If we use the reported data in Cappelen et al. [5] and focus our analysis on the cases in which 
dictators are at relative advantage with regard to the accumulation of money (pd > pr), we will find that 
15-percent of the dictators behave according to the accountability principle. In Figure 1, these 
observations would lie on the striped area; therefore these allocation choices cannot be predicted by 
the previous models of inequity aversion. Similar results can be derived from the reported results in 
Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido [11] or Ubeda [24]. For instance when pd > pr, roughly  
17-percent of the data in Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido [11] is incompatible with Fehr and 
Schmid [1] and Frohlich et al. [2], because it includes dictators who transfer xr ≥ max{𝑦/2,yr}.10  
 One important feature of our model is that dictators are allowed to weigh three different fairness 
ideals instead of only one. Graphically, this implies that any allocation on the shadowed area can be 
derived after considering that dictators weigh the lines xr = 0, xr = 𝑦 / 2, xr = ar and xr = yr. This feature 
of our model generalizes the idea that each dictator is motivated by a single fairness view (i.e., by a 
single “line”), with dictators being heterogeneous in what they consider as fair, and the marginal utility 
loss of deviating from this fairness ideal increasing in the size of the deviation. Our way of modeling 
social preference is also valid under the assumptions that fairness ideals are tradeoffs against each 
other, and heterogeneity lies inside each subject rather, than taking place across subjects. It remains to 
be discussed whether we should expect subjects to hold different fairness ideals at each time. Using a 
questionnaire, the seminal paper of Yaari [25] provides evidence that subjects choose different 
solutions for the same distribution problems, depending on the prevalence of tastes or needs in the 
story underlying each question (see also Messick and Sentis [23]). Recent experimental findings are 
also in line with the idea of within-subject heterogeneity (e.g., Croson and Konow [22], Konow [16], 
Ubeda [24], Blanco et al. [33] and Miller and Ubeda [10]). In their paper, Blanco et al. (2011) test the 
consistency of the Fehr and Schmidt's model and find that it fails to predict behavior at the individual 
level, as subjects exhibit different fairness attitudes across games (i.e., the estimation of and 𝛼  and β 
for a given subject changes depending on the game). The work of Miller and Ubeda [10] focuses on a 
                                                
10 We note that our model cannot be tested using the reported data in other experiments such as Bolton and 
Ockenfelds [28], Charness and Rabin [29] or Fehr and Schmidt [1], which do not consider a  
production stage. 




repeated dictator game with production and highlight that women are likely to switch between the 
three different fairness ideals presented in the current paper.  
4. Conclusion  
We have presented a theoretical model of social preferences that expands upon Fehr and  
Schmidt [1] and Frohlich et al. [2]. The underlying idea of our model is that dictators who are involved 
in a dictator game with production care about three different features. First, dictators get disutility if 
the final allocation deviates from the equal division. Second, dictators consider that subjects should 
receive exactly what they have produced. Finally, dictators account for the way in which entitlements 
are generated and try to compensate for factors beyond subjects' control.  
Our contribution to the literature is to provide a model that predicts the accountability principle in 
Konow [13], which states that subjects should only be rewarded for factors under their control. This 
behavior is in accordance with liberal egalitarian ethics and cannot be predicted by the models of 
inequity aversion of Fehr and Schmidt [1] and Frohlich et al. [2], although it is observed in many 
laboratory experiments.  
One novelty of our approach with respect to Cappelen et al. [5], Cappelen et al. [15] or Konow [7] 
is that we do not need to assume that, "individuals have a fairness ideal that is independent of the 
distributional function in which they find themselves [Cappelen et al. 2007, page 824].” Our model is 
suitable for this case of between-subjects heterogeneity, but it does also accommodate for the 
possibility of heterogeneity of fairness ideals lying inside each individual. 
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